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Timothy Mawe *
John Stuart Mill’s “A Few Words on Non-Intervention” (1859) considers both the
“sacred duties” owed to the independence and nationality of states and the possible
exceptions to the general rule of non-intervention. In The Question of Intervention,
Michael Doyle proposes to “comment on Mill’s arguments, defend some, condemn some,
and refine others” (10). What emerges is a clear and well-structured overview of the
ethics and legitimacy of intervention
Doyle begins in chapter 1 by outlining the case for non-intervention as the
general rule of international relations. Drawing upon Mill’s “Few Words,” Doyle posits
four “indirect” arguments in favour of non-intervention: states should abide by
international law which prohibits intervention; the expectation of intervention would be
systematically harmful by creating a moral hazard; interventions that start well can
become corrupted; and outsiders will struggle to understand the internal affairs of a state.
Doyle then outlines Mill’s “two most powerful arguments against intervention [which]
are based directly on considerations of self-determination and individual harm” (26).
Later in the chapter, there is a concise and informative account of the
entrenchment of non-intervention in international law. Finally, drawing on data compiled
with Camille Strauss-Kahn, Doyle provides an empirical assessment of the effects of
interventions. Surveying 334 “major, overt” interventions undertaken since 1815, Doyle
finds that “only 26 produced a government no worse in democratic and civil liberties
*

Timothy Mawe is a Ph.D. candidate at the department of philosophy, University College Cork. His research
interests include intervention, humanitarianism, and human rights.

The Question of Intervention 103
measures than the preceding government. That is, only 12 percent were potentially
successful in advancing the cause of liberty and democracy” (46). Given the striking level
of failure, Doyle argues that “even well-intentioned interventions designed to promote
liberty should be approached sceptically” (47).
Although non-intervention is presented as the default position, it is open to
exceptions. Chapter 2 examines the instances which may demand that the principle of
non-intervention be over-ridden. Taking his lead generally from Mill’s text, Doyle
considers the cases of rescuing nationals abroad, intervention in an internationalised civil
war, reducing harm in an ongoing civil war, and classical humanitarian intervention.
Doyle proceeds, in chapter 3, to analyse possible exceptions to the nonintervention principle that disregard, rather than override, the values underpinning the
non-intervention principle. He considers the morality and legitimacy of intervening to
support a secessionist movement, of counter-intervening to restore the internal balance of
forces, and of occupation.
Over the course of chapters 2 and 3, Doyle rarely engages in any depth with the
theoretical foundations of Mill’s arguments. Instead, a range of historical case studies are
skilfully employed to test the effectiveness of intervention in the types of cases endorsed
by Mill. For example, Britain’s intervention in Portugal in 1846 is used as a test case to
examine the effectiveness of, and reveal practical lessons for, intervening in a protracted
civil war (66–69). In a positive sense, this approach makes the study readable for a wide
audience. On the down side, the essence of Mill’s thought is somewhat diluted as
conclusions are drawn on the basis of what is deemed to have worked (or not worked) in
practice.
The penultimate chapter provides an overview of the development and operation
of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) Doctrine. Much of the chapter is somewhat
pedestrian as Doyle reviews the doctrine’s evolution. Moreover, it is not made clear how
RtoP relates to the work of Mill. Although we are told in the preface to the book that
Mill’s argument warrants “a guarded defense of the new doctrine of RtoP” (xii), Doyle
fails to substantiate this statement in the chapter dedicated to RtoP or in the book
generally.
The final chapter of the book stresses the importance of post-bellum
peacebuilding. Doyle’s analysis leads him to conclude that existing occupation law is
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inadequate as it fails to permit transformative peacebuilding. He goes on to outline the
necessity of consent and international capacity for successful peacebuilding.
Overall, the book highlights the difficulty of executing intervention. Whereas
Mill largely assumed that intervention would be effective in the cases that he discussed,
Doyle is keen to demonstrate the complexity of intervening successfully: “the more
extensive list of examples Mill invokes reveals more complexity than he recounts, and in
each case that complexity leans against the interventionist conclusions he reaches” (191).
So, even in those instances in which “something” must be done for the sake of selfdetermination, humanity, or national security, it is not always the case that intervention is
an appropriate solution. What to do when standing by is unpalatable and intervention
impractical is the conundrum that the international community faces today in Syria.

